

How to Qualify for a Non-leader, or the Man who should not have been President

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Abstract

Leadership is closely connected to the political behavior of leaders and their influence on followers. The aim of the current article is to argue that the former Tunisian interim president (henceforth, TIP) acted during his presidency as an anti-leader. The domestic and diplomatic gaffes he made from his inauguration in 2011 up to his stepping down in December 2014, cost the country numerous internal and external crises, and qualified him for losing his career as a politician. To show this, the current article combines (i) Lord & Maher's information processing theory of leadership, (ii) Avolio & Gardner's components of leadership, (iii) Critical Discourse Analysis, and (iv) Critical Metaphor Analysis. The corpus of the study consists of texts delivered by the TIP in public, on his own webpage, and to newspapers, which have been collected and commented upon in a book-length documentary by Bahloul (2013), and translated from French to English by the author of the current article.

Key words: CDA, Critical Metaphor Analysis, diplomatic gaffes, domestic gaffes, leadership

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Introduction

If I have to describe the former TIP, Moncef Marzouki, I would reiterate what Dr. Justin Frank wrote about George W. Bush in his book *Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President* (2004): “For the past three years, I have observed with increasing alarm the inconsistencies and denials of such an individual. But he is not one of my patients. He is our president” (quoted in Houghton, 2009: p. 85). This subtle insinuation that Bush was to psychoanalyze also applies to the TIP during his three years in office as a president.

In our modern times, we have known authentic political leaders such as India’s Ghandi, South Africa’s Mandela, and Egypt’s Abdunnasir. We have perceived them as leaders for their beliefs and perseverance: Ghandi for his passive resistance to British rule, Mandela for his heroic resistance against apartheid, and Abdunnasir for championing Arab unity and sovereignty. Dewan & Myatt (2012) argue that “a leader with good judgement can provide useful information to resolve uncertainties, and a leader who communicates clearly can provide a common message around which followers’ actions can coalesce” (p. 432). We have also known non-leaders such as Franco (Spain), Hitler (Germany), Mussolini (Italy), Pinochet (Chile), Stalin (ex-USSR), in non-Arab countries and Assad (Syria), Ben Ali (Tunisia), Gaddafi (Libya), Salah (Yemen), etc. in Arab countries. Although these may have been treated by their own followers as influencers, they were actually seen as dictators by non-followers. In this case, Smith et al (2007) argue that “bad leaders can be just as pathological to a group as no leaders at all” (p. 286).

As Hermann (2003) stated, “one way of learning more about political leaders that does not require their cooperation is by examining what they say” (p. 178). Ornatowski (2012) noted that “in the conduct of politics, words, actions, and events work together; words interpret events or actions, as well as constitute political facts, while actions in various ways help words gain their political efficacy” (p. 15). Since in doing politics political actors use political rhetoric, followers do “political information processing” (van Dijk, 2002: p. 206) of this rhetoric as part of their perception of leaders. Political rhetoric is constituted by “political discourse structures” (van Dijk, 2002: p. 204) such as metaphor, prototypes, and the use of pronouns. In particular, Van Dijk (2003) highlights “the ideologies about who belong to Us, and who do not” (p. 223), which consists in polarizing the world by constructing in- and out-groups. In relation to metaphor, Mio et al (2005) found the density of metaphor in charismatic presidents to be higher than in non-charismatic ones, and concluded that “metaphor may play a role in making speeches more inspirational” to followers (p. 292).

The article has the following structure. The first section addresses the components of leadership. The second section spells out the methodology of the article. The third sections deals with home gaffes while the fourth one surveys some foreign affairs gaffes. The last section offers a discussion of the findings of the article.

1. Leadership

The concept of leadership is pervasive in economics (Hermalin, 1998), politics (Smith et al, 2007), education (Spillane et al, 2004), the military (Özlen & Zukic, 2013), etc. As a result, the literature on leadership is dauntingly challenging. Hundreds of books, articles, and conferences, and numerous theories and “often conflictive perspectives of leadership” (Bligh et al, 2011: p. 1074) have been devoted to it. Space restrictions forbid a representative overview of such a sensitive and essential concept for the conduct of human societies.

At the risk of reductionism, two trends in leadership research may be isolated: (i) leader-centric theories and (ii) follower-centric theories. Leader-centric theories focus on leader

behavior and effectiveness, thus attributing the successes of the organization to the leader's efficacy. Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich (1985) call this "the romance of leadership," which consists in the development of "highly romanticized, heroic views of leadership" (p. 79). However, follower-centric theories of leadership have to do with followers-related processes, whereby leadership is affected by the perceptions followers hold about it (Lord & Maher, 1993; Vondey, 2008).

One of the most known leader-centric theories of political psychology is offered by Hermann to understand political behavior. Using content analysis and quantitative methodology of interview responses, Hermann (2003) distinguished political leaders along seven personality traits: (1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (p. 184). Empowered by computer programs, this framework produced comparative research on the leadership style of former and current political leaders world-wide. However, Winter (2003) argues that, although personality traits are important in explaining political psychology, "situational stimuli ... often override the influence of 'deeper' personality factors," and "the limitations and opportunities of particular locations in formal and informal structures and institutions set limits to the effects of personality." (p. 48).

Working within a business perspective, Avolio & Gardner (2005) developed a factorial theory of "authentic leadership," whose components are (i) positive psychological capital (confidence, optimism, hope, and resiliency), (ii) positive moral perspective (reserves of moral capacity, efficacy, courage, and resiliency), (iii) leader self-awareness (where one continually comes to understand his or her unique talents, strengths, sense of purpose, core values, beliefs and desires), (iv) leader self-regulation (the process through which authentic leaders align their values with their intentions and actions), (v) leadership processes/behaviors (the processes of identification, positive modeling, emotional contagion, supporting self-determination, and positive social exchanges go a long ways toward explaining how authentic leaders influence followers), (vi) follower self-awareness/regulation (authentic leaders are posited to heighten the self-awareness and shape the self-regulatory processes of followers), (vii) follower development (As followers internalize values and beliefs espoused by the leader their conception of what constitutes their actual and possible selves are expected to change and develop over time.), (viii) organizational context (We propose environments that provide open access to information, resources, support, and equal opportunity for everyone to learn and develop will empower and enable leaders and their associates to accomplish their work more effectively.), and (xi) veritable and sustained performance beyond expectations (creating veritable sustained performance involves non-financial intangibles and tacit knowledge, including building human, social and psychological capital, and considering how the organization is fundamentally run, including psychological contracts with employees) (pp. 322-328).

Another influential model of leadership is known as the information processing theory of leadership. Lord & Maher (1993) conceive of leadership as "the process of being perceived by others as a leader" (p. 9). Leadership perception is based on two alternative principles: (i) "Leadership can be recognized based on the fit of a person's characteristics with perceivers' implicit ideas of what leaders are," (ii) "Leadership can be inferred based on outcomes of salient events" (Lord & Maher, 1993: p. 5). The information processing theory is essentially a social-

cognitive theory, whereby leadership involves “behaviors, traits, characteristics, and outcomes produced by leaders as these elements are interpreted by followers” (Lord & Maher, 1993: p. 9). The cognitive perspective consists in explaining behaviors and perceptions in terms of “the cognitive categories (like leadership) that perceivers use to classify others” (Lord & Maher, 1993: p. 5). The theory focuses on two facets: “leadership as a perceptual phenomenon and leadership as a determinant of performance” (Lord & Maher, 1993: p. 6).

Lord & Maher (1993: p. 13) invoke information encoding, which stores information from short- into long-term memory, and information retrieval where information is recalled from long-term memory to deal with it. They (1993: pp. 13-14) argue that “the manner in which information is encoded and retrieved has critical implications for our theory of leadership perception.” Information is molded into knowledge structures such as scripts, plans, categories, and prototypes. People are categorized and labeled as leaders or non-leaders depending on appropriate perceived behaviors. According to Lord & Maher (1993), this “labeling process is powerful” because “much of the information encountered later that is relevant to the object, person, or event is processed in terms of that category” (p. 16). What accompanies the categorization or labeling of someone as a (non)-leader is the sum of the behaviors or characteristics seen against the prototypical features held about a leader or non-leader by followers. Such features may be found in Avolio & Gardner’s (2005) components of leadership.

2. Data and Method

The current article offers a case study of the TIP’s political gaffes. The objective, however, is not so much to investigate the TIP’s leadership style as to psychologically and cognitively show how the TIP’s gaffes present him as an uncharacteristic leader through the analysis of excerpts from the speeches that he gave at local, regional, or international events. The current article should not entail that the TIP did not deliver a single mouthful of political rhetoric; his speech at the European parliament made quite a sensation.¹ These gaffes have been collected in a book by Bahloul (2013), the editor of “Business News” e-newspaper. Although Bahloul inventoried no less than 45 gaffes in 22 months of the TIP’s presidency, only eight salient political gaffes have been selected for study. The reason why very few have been retained is that Bahloul’s purpose was journalistic while my objective is academic research in Tunisian politics. Because of this narrow interest in gaffes, the corpus is not a sizeable one. In fact, the study is based on a few paragraphs from the TIP’s speeches. All the data has been translated from French by the author of this article.

It is customary in studies of leadership in politics to use content analysis and the quantitative method (Hermann, 2003). For the reason expounded in the previous paragraph, the current study adopts the qualitative method, using critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2002-2003) and critical metaphor analysis (Charteris-Black, 2004) as two frameworks taking care of the analysis of the language used by the TIP. Subsequent to this analysis, Avolio & Gardner’s (2005) components of leadership and Lord & Maher’s (1993) information processing theory of leadership, are brought to bear on the TIP’s language analyzed discursively and metaphorically to measure his leadership attributes.

3. Domestic Gaffes

Before tackling domestic gaffes, a few of the TIP’s biographic highlights are in good order. The TIP is a medical doctor and a staunch human rights activist. He was influenced by Mahatma Ghandi’s non-violent resistance and Nelson Mandela’s struggle against apartheid. He joined the

Tunisian League for Human Rights, and was in 1993 one of the founding members of the National Committee for the Defense of Prisoners of Conscience. He then founded the National Committee for Liberties, and became the president of the Arab Commission for Human Rights. He was one of the founding members of the African Network for Prevention of Child Abuse. In 2001, he founded the Congress for the Republic Party (CPR), which cost him exile in France from which he came back after the “Jasmine Revolt” in 2011 with a compulsive desire to be the president of Tunisia. And he was indeed made president after an arrangement among the Troika, with the Islamist Ennahdha movement leading the government, the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties chairing the National Constituent Assembly, and the CPR, as represented by the TIP, assuming the presidency of the country.

This said, it is hard to explain why the TIP has undercut during his presidency his remarkable career as a human rights defender, his long-standing opposition to the former dictatorial regime, and his exceptional language proficiency in Arabic, French, and English. The pattern of his leadership failure may include the following: (i) taxing all those who oppose him as counter-revolutionaries, (ii) creating enmity even with his own allies, (iii) cultivating a form of inertia vis-à-vis human rights issues such as abolishing capital punishment, extraditing a former Libyan minister, etc., and (iv) refraining from denouncing unpopular and undemocratic practices committed by his allies. Thus, it is not surprising that the TIP’s short career as a president is fraught with self-defeat.

3.1. *Sefirat Gaffe*

Tunisia has always been tolerant in religious matters and flexible in dress owing to its historical links with Europe and the reformism of its religious leaders such as Fadel Ben Achourⁱⁱ, who praised the introduction of the Personal Status Code, which abolished polygamy in Tunisia in the late 1950s, as “an imperative of modern times ... but always in conformity with the foundational texts of Islam.” Stepan (2012) termed this religion-politics interaction “the twin tolerations,” which consist in the “toleration ... of religious citizens toward the state” and that of “the state toward religious citizens” (pp. 89-90). With this configuration, Stepan (2012) argues that “Tunisia’s secular parties and Islamists have a chance to add to the world’s repertoire of ways in which religion, society, and the state can relate to one another under democratic conditions” (p. 100).

In his inaugural address to Tunisians, the TIP gave them a piece of freedom of dress as part of his political program:

Our mission is to set up a solid base in order to build a peaceful, pluralist society and avoid another revolution and a third Constituent Assembly. We have to protect those women wearing the *niqab*, those who are veiled, and those who are sefirat (unveiled) (p. 14, 13 Dec 2011).

Faithful to his human rights background, the TIP wanted to make a difference with the intolerance of veiled women under the regime of his ousted predecessor, Ben Ali. For him, a peaceful and pluralist society goes by the toleration of the vestimentary way of the others, and he chose women. There are at least three problems with this speech. First, it inverts the historical sequence of categories of women, prioritizing those wearing a *niqab* and those veiled over unveiled women, thus indirectly tolerating, supporting, and even legitimizing Salafism, which was responsible for many political assassinations in Tunisia, and was outlawed by the

government of Ennahdha movement as a terrorist organization. The possible aim behind this dangerous flirt with Salafists is for the TIP to score points in favor of Ennahdha movement in recognition for pushing him into power. The opposition parties in general have been hostile to this rapprochement between Salafists and top state officials when the former were received at the Presidency of the Republic in Carthage. Later events corroborated the opposition parties' fears and belied the TIP.

Second, in classifying women in terms of what they wear (or don't wear), the TIP reduced women to what they have *on* the head not *in* the head. This kind of metonymic thinking has a divisive and reductionist effect on the personality of women, thus objectifying them through a cultural artifact. Third, the TIP, perhaps inadvertently, made a linguistic blunder by using *sefirat* (unveiled women). In Modern Standard Arabic, the word means those who are not wearing a veil but in the Tunisian Arabic dialect it means "almost uncovered women, bordering the way of life of prostitutes," which created discontent and disgust throughout the country. It was reported by Bahloul (2013) that, as a way of protesting against the TIP's blunder, many women have nonchalantly added in front of their name the word *sefira* (singular of *sefirat*) on the social networks (p. 14).

Nearly six months after his inaugural address, the TIP reiterated his support for the freedom of dress:

We should accept the other, be they progressionists, Islamists, or Salafis, without demonizing them ... All Tunisians have the same rights and duties. I cannot understand the existence of discrimination against citizens for their way of dressing or their way of practicing their religion ... I cannot understand and I do not accept that female students be prevented from sitting for exams because they wear the *niqab* (p. 110, 16 May 2013).

The TIP was trying to indirectly please Ennahdha movement through backing Salafi female students' right to enter exam rooms at the College of Arts (Manouba, Tunis) wearing the *niqab* when the scientific council of the College overwhelmingly banned wearing it during exams for safety reasons, which cost him having the faculty members' trade union on the back.

3.2. *Opposition Gaffe*

The relation between the TIP and the opposition has never been good, because the latter has been systematically critical of him about his bias to the Troika and his incapacity to be a leader for all Tunisians. In a televised debate, the TIP gave the following legitimization of hosting extremist preachers:

The talks given by the Egyptian preacher, Wajdi Ghenim, can be classified under freedom of expression. We should not be scared of an imminent propagation of the Salafi ideology in Tunisia. I am a human rights activist, and I cannot prevent an organization known for holding meetings and inviting speakers and preachers. This takes place within the framework of freedom of expression (p. 35, 15 February 2012).

Engrossed by his human rights background, the TIP confused proselytizing for freedom of expression. This Egyptian preacher talked his audience into circumcising girls at a time when the Tunisian society was suffering from unemployment, poverty, and unequal distribution of wealth. The TIP not only asked Tunisians not to be afraid of "the Salafi ideology in Tunisia" but also presupposed that the Salafi ideology would propagate. This lack of political vision situated him

among utterly uncharismatic leaders. Conger (1987) notes that “a leader becomes charismatic when he/she succeeds in changing his/her followers’ attitudes to accept the advocated vision” (p. 640). The TIP was unable to tease his mind out for leadership, which prevented him from acting as a genuine leader and defending the country from an imminent danger – that of looming terrorism.

When voices, especially those of women, went up against the TIP’s legitimization of Salafism, he tried to rectify his shots as follows:

The rights and freedoms which Tunisian women enjoy are untouchable, and this man [Wajdi Ghenim] is abnormal. Those who invited him in Tunisia are a minority, and are microbes. They think of finding here the ideal ground to germinate, but they are wrong (p. 37, 15 February 2012).

To redeem himself in the eyes of women, the TIP declared that the rights acquired by Tunisian women were inalienable, that the Egyptian preacher was “abnormal,” and that the Salafists whom the Egyptian preacher addressed were “microbes” that would not “germinate” in the inhospitable Tunisian society. The conceptualization of Salafists as microbes derives from the other side of his personality – that of his being a medical doctor. A microbe is by definition a bacterium-like micro-organism which is at the origin of disease in the body. To deal with body microbes, anti-biotic treatment is needed. This conceptual metaphor of the SALAFISTS AS MICROBES entails that Salafists are micro-organisms that create problems in the body politic and society, and, therefore, they should be eradicated. This reversal of opinion of the TIP against the Egyptian Salafist preacher and the Salafists in Tunisia augurs of an unstable personality, capable of stating something and the opposite of it at once. In terms of Hermann’s (2003) traits, his personality is lacking in “conceptual complexity,” i.e. “the conceptually simple individual tends to classify objects and ideas into good-bad, black-white, either-or dimensions” (pp. 195-96). The TIP’s dealings with women and the Salafists instantiate his conceptual simplicity. Thus, in a matter of three months, the TIP managed to have against him women, the opposition, and the Salafists.

However, no sooner did he think he won women to his side as followers, than he made a biased move against the secular opposition in Tunisia. In an interview to Al Jazeera channel, the TIP attacked the opposition in the following terms:

These secular extremists do not understand that they should face up to a second big revolution which would have no pity on them, and in which there would be no sensible and gentleman-like people such as Rached Ghannouchi, Moncef Marzouki or Mustapha Ben Jaafar ... They would have to face up to scaffolds and gallows (p. 93, 25 March 2013).

People in the opposition were framed as “extremists” and counter-revolutionaries whose fate would be the guillotine (“scaffolds and gallows”). Not only did the TIP want to silence the opposition parties, but also presented himself as someone inciting for political violence and mayhem. In contradistinction, the representatives of the other parties forming the Troika are presented as moderate and sensible gentlemen.

As a continuation of his demonization of the opposition, the TIP washed his dirty linen in public at a Press Conference in Qatar:

We have invited them [opposition parties] many times to sit down with us around the same table for consultation and to be constructive at this transitional phase, leaving aside our differences for the time being, but they turned down our offer. As if the devil is embodied in this Troika! ... Unfortunately, these extremists have refused moderation and middle-ground and have attempted to tear apart the texture of the homeland ... Opponents have conditioned their collaboration against the neutrality of the ministries of sovereignty. However, their wish realized, they denigrated and slighted this achievement. Ennahdha has generously accepted this neutrality in order to establish calm, security, and civil peace. But its gesture has been received with derogation, satire, and carelessness. In their eyes, this costly demand quickly became pointless and insignificant (p. 100, 26 March 2013).

The TIP showed a positive self-presentation of the Troika and a negative other-presentation of the opposition. He posits a WE vs. THEY dyad, whereby WE are accommodating (“we have invited them”), understanding (“consultation”), and positive (“constructive”). However, THEY are unaccommodating (“extremists” and “opponents”), immoderate (“refused moderation and middle-ground”), and divisive (“attempted to tear apart the texture of the homeland”). He offers a eulogy of Ennahdha as having “generously accepted this neutrality in order to establish calm, security, and civil peace” while the “opponents” are presented negatively as having “received with derogation, satire, and carelessness” Ennahdha’s sacrifice. Hermann (2003) argues that leaders who do not believe in their own ability to control events are “quick to accuse others of making it difficult for them to act” (p. 190).

At the end of this Press Conference in Qatar, the TIP unleashed his attack on the opposition:

Political rivalry is always based on bad faith and cruelty. Indeed, adversaries are cruel to each other, and have recourse to slander and to cancan. But there are red lines not to cross, except that extremists have crossed them ... My colleagues and I spend all our time trying to put out fires while the other extremists do nothing but pour oil on fire... I am not defending Ennahdha, but being aware of the secrets of the State, accusing this party of being behind this crime (Belaid’s assassination) is pure indecency (pp. 100-1, 26 March 2013).

The TIP’s incapacity to play the role of a political leader and be at the same remove from all Tunisians has failed him greatly. He involves himself into party politics even though he resigned as president of his own party to be president. He constantly shows incapability to accept criticism from opposition parties, and classifies that as “red lines not to cross.” The TIP silenced the voice of freedom of expression inside the others. He presents himself and Rached Ghannouchi (leader of Ennahdha movement) and Mustapha Ben Jaafar (chair of the National Constituent Assembly and Ettakatol party) as playing the fire brigade “putting out fires” while the extremists “pour oil on fire.” In contrast to what he has many times claimed, he never tired of praising Ennahdha and its leader. Clearly, the TIP failed to see himself as part of the bigger picture of the country as a unifying force, and could only occasionally see in his divided self an interested human rights activist and a biased party member.

3.3. Socks-and-Shoes Theory Gaffe

The TIP has made many individuals, entities, and even cities victims of his gaffes. On an official visit to Siliana, a poor and agricultural city in the north-west of Tunisia, he reacted to the

impatient crowd waiting for him: “I have not come here with my shoes and socks to be prevented from circulating.” Many victims in the city suffered from being sprayed by riot police with cluster-like bombs, which cost many of them loss of one eye and serious body injuries.

In his meeting with the officials of Siliana, the TIP developed what could be conveniently dubbed the “socks-and-shoes theory”:

The situation resembles that of a father who has two children, one with a pair of shoes and the other barefooted. What should this father do when he has little money? Should he buy a pair of shoes to the one who is barefooted, or a pair of socks to the one who wears shoes? They tell me you can do both. No! I cannot do both, because if I buy socks to the one who has shoes, I will not have the means to buy shoes to the one who is barefooted. This is the situation! We should understand that we should first buy shoes to the one who is barefooted, and the one that already has a pair of shoes must wait. Otherwise ... I don't know what to do ... We must borrow money? No! I cannot borrow money since we are already deeply indebted. The one who will lend us money will mortgage the shoes and the child (p. 43-44, 1 March 2012).

This excerpt of the speech builds on a mixture of Nurturant Parent Model and Strict Father Model. At the beginning, the TIP framed himself as a Nurturant Parent willing to come to the rescue of his children without hiding his bewilderment about his nurturant capacity. This may be captured through the conceptual metaphor, A PRESIDENT IS A CARING FATHER. However, this father quickly presented himself to his children as a poverty-stricken one. However, half-way in his speech the TIP shifted to the Strict Father Model, which can be captured in the conceptual metaphor, A PRESIDENT IS A STRICT FATHER. Invoking indebtedness, he said “No! I cannot borrow money,” thus re-categorizing himself as a strict parent unable to provide his children with happiness, protection, and unconditional nurturance. Our knowledge about children tells us that the TIP can be judged as “a deadbeat dad, refusing to pay for the support of his children” (Lakoff, 2002: p. 7), and incapable of giving nurturance freely and unconditionally.

Apart from the damage done by the shift from Nurturant Parent to Strict Father, the socks-and-shoes metaphor has a polarizing effect, dividing the country into haves (“with a pair of shoes”) and have-nots (“barefooted”), with the TIP as a Strict Father unable to come to the rescue of his citizens. The socks-and-shoes metaphor does not give hope to people for the future. Rather, it has literally added insult to injury. As Smith et al (2007) note, “people do not necessarily need to receive more resources to be happy, but they do need decisions to be made by decision makers who are not selfishly motivated and who are not driven by ambition” (p. 297).

3.4. *Ennahdha Gaffe*

The TIP has even made his own allies the target of his gaffes. At the 2nd Congress of his own party (CPR), the TIP made someone read his speech:

The practices and the attempts of the government and of Ennahdha to monopolize all the powers similar to the former regime of Ben Ali through multiplying nominations of its adherents (be they competencies or not) at the top of various decision-making centers throughout the country, making use of robust means vis-à-vis protesters against the regime and wanting to impose the parliamentary system as a political system of government which

would favor the centralization of all the powers in the hands of the Prime Minister (p. 75, 24 August 2012).

The TIP is highly critical of the government and of Ennahdha on three counts: (i) partisan nominations, (ii) coercion against opponents, and (iii) pushing for a parliamentary system of government. On the first point, the TIP meets the opposition's claim that this is a strategy on the part of Ennahdha to hijack the elections at the end of 2014, which reminds them of the former regime's monopoly of the legislative and executive powers. The second point denounces Ennahdha as exercising dictatorship against its opponents by bullying them and suing them in courts. The third point denounces the fact that a parliamentary system would transfer the powers in the hands of the Prime Minister at the expense of the President of the Republic. Since he wanted to remain in Carthage as president, the TIP wanted through this critique to negotiate more power for the position of President.

At the same CPR Congress, the TIP was so critical of the government that he demarcated himself completely in the following terms:

The performance of the government has not been at a level with citizens' demands inflamed by years of repression ... A mini government of competencies which would leave no place to partisan considerations should be formed ... If we continue on this path, we will go straight into a sure loss (pp. 86-7, 24 August 2012).

This evaluation of the performance of the government is a recognition that the Troika has failed to conduct the affairs of the country. But because this recognition is voiced up by an insider, it has surely offended the coalition, especially Ennahdha movement leading it. It has also offended because it reminds the Troika of the political assassination of Chokri Belaid on 6 February, 2012, after which Ennahdha's Prime Minister, Mohamed Jebali, resigned his position, and called for a government of technocrats, which Ennahdha movement was adamantly against. As a rebuttal of these criticisms, former Ennahdha Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, Samir Dilou, criticized the TIP on Express FM Radio for acting from outside the government as if he were in the opposition, which is further evidence that the TIP was acting in a partisan way and not as a leader of the country.

So far, internally, the TIP has cultivated a systematic enmity with many sections of Tunisian society such as women, the Salafists, the opposition parties, and even his own allies in the Troika. This enmity has been analyzed discursively through the language of his home or internal gaffes. However, some of these gaffes are also non-linguistic, and will not be dealt with in depth. One of these behavioral gaffes consists in celebrating the drafting of the Constitution, in which a triple offense was occasioned to home and foreign affairs: (i) celebrating this at the eve of the commemoration by the Tunisian people of the assassination of Chokri Belaid (6 February 2013), (ii) insulting the intelligence of Tunisians about the country's indebtedness and economic difficulties and spending colossal sums of money over personalities invited to celebrate with him, and (iii) inviting the Iranian Chief of Parliament, and giving him the floor to denounce the Americans' handling of Iran's nuclear affairs, whose speech made the Americans leave the National Constituent Assembly room.

4. Diplomatic Gaffes

Diplomatic gaffes are turned against foreign countries' diplomacy and sovereignty, which occasioned many diplomatic crises between Tunisia and several other nations.

4.1. France Gaffe

In his very first week in power, the TIP gave an interview to a French newspaper (JDD) in which he stated the following:

The French, prisoners of a doxa vis-à-vis Islam, are often least capable of understanding the Arab world... I have very little appreciation for culturalist, not to say racist, considerations expressed by some in Paris, including former foreign minister Hubert Védrine, who wonders if the West should export its democracy. As if democracy was a thing of the West... The colonial spirit is over (p. 19, 18 Dec. 2011)

The TIP accused the French of being dogmatic in thinking that political Islam is bad ("prisoners of a doxa concerning Islam"), and of being racist in thinking that Tunisia cannot be a democratic country because it is not a western country ("the West should export its democracy"). The TIP also accused the French of behaving with Tunisia as if it were still a French colony ("The colonial spirit is over"). Tunisia and France are historically linked, and most of Tunisia's economic exchanges are transacted with France. This undiplomatic handling of the Tunisian-French relations is detrimental to Tunisia on many a level: on the large Tunisian colony in France, on the diplomatic relations between both countries, and on economic repercussions such as sending no tourists, withholding aid, and blocking the import-export between the two countries.

4.2. Algeria Gaffe ⁱⁱⁱ

The TIP did not spare Algeria his gaffes. While on a visit to Libya, he blamed the Algerian government for the events that caused mayhem in the 1990s in Algeria, and declared what follows:

Aware that Islam is the solution, the citizens of the Arab Spring countries favored the accession to power of Islamists ... For this reason, Islamists won the elections in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt... It is important to respect the victory of Islamists, otherwise the 1990s Algerian scenario will be repeated... If Algerians had accepted the results of the ballot, the country would not have sunk in violence and bloodshed. (pp. 21-22, 2 January 2012)

Eulogizing political Islam, the TIP indirectly incriminated the 1990s Algerian government, which is a tactless approach. When the security situation went out of hand at the frontier between Tunisia and Algeria in the last three years, the Algerian army has protected the back door of Tunisia. Although the Algerian government did not show enthusiastic support for the revolution in Tunisia, it did not make use of any form of sabotage to jeopardize it. For the TIP to make the 1990s Algerian government responsible for the failure of political Islam in Algeria was interference in Algeria's sovereignty and incitement for sedition.

4.3. Morocco's Gaffe

At the NCA and at the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the republic, the TIP said in the presence of the then ambassador of Morocco in Tunis:

Even if it coexists with the values of equality, individual freedoms, and other human rights, monarchy remains a regime incompatible with democracy. At the top of the State, a citizen finds himself enjoying the right of which he is the only depository. He stays for life, and transmits to an heir of his own choosing without the people having any say (p. 73, 25 July, 2012).

In the same way he incited the Islamists to seek power in Algeria, the TIP was inciting the Moroccans to question their toleration of monarchy, which is interference in Moroccan internal affairs.

The following day, the TIP gave a declaration that has been reported by the Moroccan newspaper, *Le Mag*, in which he says:

Monarchy is a multi-secular heritage, which is adopted by Moroccan because they feel close to it and they are listened to through it... The existing synergy between the throne and the people is strongly represented by the King's proposal and the people's adoption of the July constitution that marked a positive interaction between the country's institutions and the people (p. 73, 26 July, 2012).

The TIP seems to love to contradict himself or to make a gaffe and try to repair it, with the result that he loses face and creates tension with sister countries. Algeria and Morocco are countries that are close to Tunisia in cultural and economic cultures.

4.4. Egypt Gaffe

One day after former President Morsi of Egypt was ousted from power by the Egyptian army, the TIP posted the following declaration on the official site of the Presidency of the Republic:

The direct intervention of the Egyptian military institution in political affairs and civil institutions is unacceptable at the international and African levels since it may widen the circle of violence and extremism if return to the democratic process is not done in the shortest of times in this country (p. 117, 4 July, 2013).

The TIP was reacting pre-emptively in favor of his own self and in favor of Ennahdha movement because he was scared the same may happen to him and Ennahdha owing to his growing unpopularity and that of Ennahdha government. His declaration showed lack of diplomatic tact and interference in Egyptian home affairs. Apart from receiving a negative support on the part of Egyptians themselves, the declaration has also angered Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with the latter withdrawing its diplomatic mission in Tunis. After convening the Tunisian Ambassador in Cairo, Egyptians reacted diplomatically to this interference through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqué, saying: "The declarations of Marzouki are incompatible with the positive relations between the peoples of Egypt and Tunisia and Egyptians' aspirations to see good relations being established with all Arab countries, including the brotherly Tunisian people (p. 118, 9 July 2013)."

Discussion

I propose that leadership starts on a baseline, whereby perceptions by potential followers are not yet psychologically biased to a political actor. In other words, a political actor is given the benefit of the doubt to perform as a leader, i.e. s/he is, so to speak, innocent till s/he is proved a non-leader. Upon operationalizing leadership behaviors, a political actor may begin to be processed as possessing features of leadership as in Avolio & Gardner's (2005) factorial theory. The more features of leadership are perceived, the more a political actor is pushed up above the baseline of leadership. The more failures there are, the less toleration there is vis-à-vis a political actor to occupy in the followers' mind the position of a leader. Thus, a dynamic up-down political psychology is assumed to take place in the evaluation of leadership.

The TIP's gaffes are analyzed through Lord and Maher's (1993) information processing theory of leadership combined with Van Dijk's (2002) "political information processing" model. Both Lord & Maher (1993) and Van Dijk (2002) offer socio-cognitive theories of information processing of political leadership and discourse. The endpoint of political information processing is the perception by followers of a political actor either as an authentic leader or a non-leader. Processing dips into political cognition, which "largely deals with the mental representations people share as political actors" (Van Dijk, 2002: p. 203). Processing, thus, depends largely on shared "prototypes" (Lord & Maher, 1993). Political actors may draw their mental representations either from individual cognition or social cognition. If individual cognition is relied upon, political actors will depend on episodic memory in which reside their own beliefs and idiosyncratic mental models, which may be incompatible with mental representations held by followers. The rejection by followers of the political actor's mental representations means that the latter are in the followers' short-term memory. In such a case, the political actor will more likely be labeled as a "non-leader" owing to the unshared political discourse structures such as metaphor, prototypes, pronouns, and other classification systems in individual memories and cognitions. If, however, social cognition is drawn upon, political actors will depend on their long-term memory in which reside common beliefs and mental models, which are shared by followers. In such a case, the political actor will more likely be labeled as an "authentic leader" owing to the shared political structures and other classification systems in social cognition.

In his inaugural address, the TIP made his first step on the leadership baseline. At first, many of the TIP's followers had confidence that he would be a genuine leader owing to their knowledge about his human rights background and lack of involvement with the previous corrupt regime. In other words, followers have capitalized on this political capital or Tunisian prototype which was expected to be operationalized by the TIP in his leadership style. Awamleh & Gardner (1999) argue that "when people use prototypes to infer leadership, strong delivery of an idealized and well-articulated vision will lead to perceptions of charisma and leader effectiveness" (p. 367). However, very soon in the speech the TIP sank in the perception of many followers below the baseline of leadership effectiveness because he was not able to operationalize the leadership behavior expected of him. Indeed, the TIP categorized women in the *Sefirat Gaffe* in his own individual cognition and long-term memory in terms of vestimentary artifacts. Since this categorization only translates the TIP's mental model of woman, it was not shared by all the followers. The TIP used as a political discourse structure a form of prioritization of veiled, veiled with a *niqab*, and unveiled, which conflicted with that in his followers' cognition and long-term memory. In doing so, he showed no consideration for the psychological, moral, and political effects of this categorization on women themselves and other

categories in the Tunisian society. Thus, the TIP began to lose followers and to be likely labeled by soon-to-be-lost followers as a non-leader.

Lord & Maher (1993) argue that “the labeling process is powerful” (p. 16), which means that “once a stimulus is categorized, much of the information encountered later ... is processed in terms of that category.” When followers’ self-awareness is not heightened by the TIP, they continue to mold him in the non-leader category. With the Opposition Gaffe, people in the opposition have been categorized as “secular extremists.” This religious categorization of political opponents operates an important schism in Tunisian society between secular extremists, secular moderates, religious extremists, and religious moderates, which categorization shows the TIP to be unable of psychological and moral resiliency to regain the confidence of lost followers. Instead of uniting, the TIP divides, and does not seem to care about negatively influencing his followers. Thus, from the Sefirat Gaffe in which he failed to heighten the self-awareness of followers to the Opposition Gaffe, the TIP also failed to shape the self-regulatory processes of followers in his own favor, which builds up a permanent place for him as a non-leader in lost followers’ cognition and long-term memory. Thus, aware of the TIP’s negative political beliefs and values, people in the opposition get added to women as lost followers, and began to construct a block against him owing to his inflexibility to turn his mishaps round.

With the Socks-and-Shoes Theory Gaffe, the TIP gave his audience lack of confidence instead of trust in assisting them, pessimism instead of optimism in resolving their problems, and despair instead of hope in the future, which is the anti-thesis of Avolio & Gardner’s positive psychological capital in a leader. Shamir, House, & Arthur (1993) argue that “people would ... follow leaders who provide hope (a vision) for a better future and faith in its attainment, even if such faith cannot be translated into specific proximal goals whose attainment is highly probable” (p. 583). Returning to Mio et al’s (2005) correlation between the density of metaphor and charisma, the TIP gave his followers very few metaphors since he proved to be able to create either negative ones (microbes) or unsuccessful ones as the Socks-and-Shoes.

At the moral level, the TIP showed inefficiency to problematize the plight of citizens in socks-and-shoes terms, which must have disappointed them greatly. However, his face-to-face with the stricken city of Siliana showed him talentless in rhetoric, powerless in action, and ideologically lacking in a sense of purpose in face of the dwindling number of his followers, whose perception of the TIP is now more and more settled below the baseline of leadership effectiveness. According to Awamleh & Gardner (1999), “to maximize their influence potential, leaders must provide a strongly articulated and idealized vision, and successfully attain high performance outcomes” (p. 367). Clearly, in this case and many others, the TIP failed to show a vision, which is a characteristic of authentic leaders.

The Ennahdha Gaffe was significant at many a level. It came at the 2nd Congress of his own party in August 2012, questioning the very competency of Ennahdha movement to rule the country. While observers may have seen this as a sign that the Troika was disintegrating, what the TIP did was unethical. He was not expected to meddle with party politics as the president of the country. Ennahdha followers must have had less confidence in the TIP because of his negative moral reserves, showing himself ungrateful and hypocritical vis-à-vis Ennahdha movement. Many Tunisians did not admit the fact that the TIP (a secular guy) entered into a deal with Ennahdha (a religious political movement) in the first place out of self-interest.

So far, the leader-follower relations are tense, with the TIP setting the number of non-followers on the increase. Now he has women, Salafists, people in the opposition, and Ennahdha movement, one of his allies, against him. Tunisians began to have qualms about him. He had

bizarre opinions, attitudes, and attire, and he did his best to create enemies. His uncharacteristic behavior as a president cost him an attempt of impeachment at the National Constituent Assembly for “poor political performance.”^{iv} When this failed, a petition was signed by 881 citizens questioning his medical sanity, and some have called upon him to resign.^v

In international politics, domestic affairs may influence foreign affairs and vice versa (Putnam, 1988: p. 427). The TIP’s interference in the internal affairs of other countries reflected negatively on Tunisia’s domestic affairs. Although diplomatic gaffes had less direct influence on the TIP’s followers, yet this got added to the home losses incurred by the TIP, and acted against his positive psychological capital and moral perspective. Relations with France and Algeria are particularly sensitive since the former has privileged economic relations with Tunisia and the latter is protecting the back door of the Tunisia from terrorist stabs. Bad relations with Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco may have affected commercial exchanges, financial investments, and political stances with these countries, respectively.

Conclusion

The current article has offered a study of non-leadership, showing that the TIP was lacking in the charisma of leaders. Domestic and diplomatic gaffes have been analyzed through a combined framework of leadership theories represented by Avolio & Gardner’s (2005) authentic theory of leadership and Lord & Maher’s (1993) socio-cognitive information processing theory of leadership as well as cognitive linguistic theories such as critical discourse analysis and critical metaphor analysis. In general, the TIP acted with impulsivity and tended to react offensively although at two exceptional moments at the French (18 July 2012) and European (6 February 2013) parliaments he managed to make a sensation.

Commenting on Bahloul’s book, one of the editors of Apollonia Editions has written what follows: “The author offers us here the funeral oration of the political career of Moncef Marzouki, who was catapulted as a president of the Republic at the cost of dealings whose only aim was his greed for honors. In this book, the integrity of facts and reliability of commentaries should remind us of a dreadful transition where the values that a president was supposed to defend completely melted in a ludicrously impossible grandeur.”^{vi}

In the 2014 presidential election campaign, the TIP’s slogan for the first round was: “*We will triumph or we will triumph*,” which turned out to be an unhappy borrowing from the African dictator, Laurent Gbagbo.^{vii} The false alternative introduced through “or” created in the mind of his followers a rejection of his possible defeat, which reveals the dark, undemocratic side of his mind, and dangerously incited political violence in his home town after the declaration of the final results. Although he congratulated the president elect and made a speech to pacify the mob burning government buildings, his campaign showed him to be avid for power and oblivious of alternation of power, especially when he cried for fraud in the second round of the elections if he were not elected before the announcement of the results. In the second round, the slogan has slightly been changed into “*Tunisia is triumphing*,” whereby his possible re-election was framed as a triumph for Tunisia.

By organizing a divisive campaign, polarizing Northerners and Southerners, the TIP’s eagerness for power made him think of triumphing over Tunisia. Qualifying the TIP as a “former president” even before the second round of elections, one of his former close friends^{viii} wrote: “The kind of frantic aggressiveness in which the former president threw himself, hoping for an electoral victory, will have no chance of succeeding.” Bass (1999) makes a distinction between a “transformational leader” and a “transactional leader”: “the transformational leader emphasizes

what you can do for your country; the transactional leader, on what your country can do for you” (p. 9). If the TIP can be called a leader, he is certainly of the transactional type.

Confirmation of the political death of the TIP can be sought in the outcome of presidential elections. On the first round of the presidential elections on 23 November 2014, the electorate gave the TIP 33% of the total vote while the second round on 21 December 2014 saw his defeat with 44.32% of the overall vote against 55.68% for the president elect. The fact that the TIP did not manage to be re-elected is, at least partly, tantamount to an electoral sanction for being a characteristically charismatic non-leader.

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Endnotes

ⁱ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20130206RES05666/20130206RES05666.pdf>

ⁱⁱ http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Fadhel_Ben_Achour

ⁱⁱⁱ Moncef Marzouki nearly created a diplomatic incident with Algeria. *Business News*, 5-1-2012. (http://www.businessnews.com.tn/details_article.php?t=520&a=28596&temp=1&lang)

^{iv} Tunisians sign a petition to examine Interim president Marzouki’s mental health condition, *Tunis Times*, Sep. 2, 2013 (<http://www.thetunistimes.com/2013/09/daffy-initiative-tunisian-community-residing-france-40619/>).

^v Marzouki dishonors the function of president: Should he resign? <http://mustapha-stambouli.blogspot.com/2012/06/marzouki-nhonore-pas-la-fonction.html> (accessed on 2/2/2014).

^{vi} Abdelaziz Belkhodja at <http://www.tuniscope.com/index.php/article/33144/culture/art/bonte-335209#.UukautKSzMs>

^{vii} Ahmed Brahim, Alone against all or the sheriff Mohamed Moncef Marzouki against the twelve bastards. <http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/seul-contre-tous-ou-le-sherif-mmm-contre-les-douze-salopards?id=15772&nuid=0&did=0>

^{viii} Aziz Krichen, Why will Moncef Marzouki be defeated, <http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/aziz-krichen-pourquoi-moncef-marzouki-sera-battu?id=15773&nuid=0&did=0>